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CASES NOTED
loss as one of the hazards of doing business.24 Whether or not the war-
ranty of fitness arises will therefore depend, as in the sales transaction, on
the totality of the commercial setting. This setting includes, but is not
limited to, such factors as expertise of the lessor, reliance by the lessee,
and the general character of the lessor's business.2 5 In conclusion, the
court states a rule which echoes the language of the UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE,
26
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, where the lessor
has reason to know any particular purpose for which the leased
chattel is required and that the lessee is relying upon the lessor's
skill or judgment to select or furnish a suitable chattel, there
is an implied warranty that the chattel shall be fit for such
purpose.27
In the opinion of this writer, the position taken by the Supreme Court
of Florida in the case at bar is a realistic one which recognizes the de-
mands of a commercial society in which greater numbers of people are
leasing rather than purchasing. Since the sale-lease distinction is, at best,
an artificial one, there is little justification for not applying the same
theory of liability in both situations. It is clear that the movement towards
extending warranty liability in chattel lease cases will necessitate greater
protection for the lessee. It is clear that the principles of the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE encourage and afford an ideal and convenient means
for the development of this line of judicial reasoning.
KAREN BETH KAY
IMPEACHMENT OF A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE:
THE DOOR IS OPEN
The defendant, Viven Harris, was charged with the sale of heroin.
After arrest but without having been given the Miranda warnings, he
made certain statements to the police. These statements, concerning what
the defendant had sold-heroin or baking powder-were introduced into
evidence at defendant's trial for impeachment purposes to contradict parts
of his direct testimony. The jury was instructed to consider these state-
ments only in the context of the defendant's credibility and not as an ad-
mission or evidence of guilt. Harris was found guilty. The Supreme Court
of New York affirmed.' The New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a per
curiam opinion holding that notice need not be given to a defendant before
24. Id. at 100.
25. Id.
26. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315. See note 5 supra.
27. 238 So.2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970).
1. 31 A.D.2d 828 298 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1969).
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trial when defendant's statements are used solely for impeachment pur-
poses, and are not offered into evidence. 2 On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court held affirmed: A statement made to the police by a
defendant when the police had not warned the defendant of his right to
appointed counsel, as required by Miranda v. Arizona,3 could be used to
impeach the defendant's direct testimony. Harris v. New York, 91 S. Ct.
643 (1971).
A basic rule of evidence states that an accused who takes the stand
in his own behalf subjects himself to the same liabilities on cross-
examination as do other witnesses. Therefore, he is subject to impeach-
ment.4 A primary method of impeachment is to prove that a witness has
made prior statements inconsistent with his present testimony. Although
there is a split of authority5 on whether such statements are admissible,
there has always been a line of cases in the United States which has fol-
lowed this rule completely, permitting an accused who offers himself as a
witness to be impeached by proof of a confession or statements even when
such are not shown to have been legally obtained.'
In 1914, the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States7 was an-
nounced. In the Weeks case, letters taken in violation of the fourth
amendment search and seizure rule were not permitted to be used at the
trial. The Court stated:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of en-
deavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land.8
The Supreme Court, in Walder v. United States,' began to limit the
rule of the Weeks case. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Walder
majority, said that the defendant
must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him
without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by
way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not
available for its case in chief.'0
2. 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. C. McCoRMIC, LAW OF EVmENCE § 131 (1954).
5. See Note 22 infra and accompanying text.
6. Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Hicks v. State, 99 Ala. 169,
13 So. 375 (1893); Commonwealth v. Tolliver, 119 Mass. 312 (1876); State v. Fisher, 108
Mont. 68, 88 P.2d 53 (1939). Florida's position is contra. In State v. Galasso, 217 So.2d
326 (Fla. 1968), the Supreme Court of Florida specifically held that pre-trial statements
tainted by reason of failure to give the defendant the Miranda warnings should be excluded
for all purposes, including impeachment of defendant. See also Young v. State, 234 So.2d 341,
(Fla. 1970).
7. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8. Id. at 393.
9. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
. 14. At 0$ ,
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However, there are certain cases to which this rule does not apply. Walder,
a case of impeachment as to a collateral issue, was one example. The
Court cited Michelson v. United States" as another instance. In Michel-
son the Court allowed the use of a reputation witness by the state to con-
tradict the defendant's reputation witness.
The next case involving such special circumstances was Tate v.
United States. 2 In Tate, the court held that a defendant could be im-
peached by improperly obtained evidence if the statement made related
to "lawful proper acts"'" collateral to the issues before the jury.'4
Bailey v. United States'5 involved a claim of a violation of the re-
quirements set forth in Mallory v. United States6 and held that a de-
fendant could be impeached on minor points by his prior statements.
Harris v. New York moves a major step further and holds that a de-
fendant who takes the stand "may" be impeached by inconsistent prior
statements which, while they bear directly on the crimes charged, cannot
be used as evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief.' 8
Chief Justice Burger extended the holding in Walder to the present
case, reasoning that there is no basic difference between impeachment as
to collateral issues and impeachment as to matters bearing directly on the
crime. The benefits to be gained by giving the jury an added insight into
the credibility of the defendant outweigh the possibility of fostering the
impermissible police conduct which the Miranda Court feared. Appar-
ently, Justice Burger's chief concern is to avoid the possibility that the
defendant may be committing perjury. This is evidenced by the fact that
in his opinion, Justice Burger relies on cases which hold that prosecutions
for perjury are not barred by the fact that the defendant's testimony,
which is subsequently challenged as perjured, was given without the de-
fendant having been advised of his constitutional rights according to
11. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
12. 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
13. Id. at 380.
14. [S]tatements concerning lawful activity uttered during a period of "unnecessary
delay" before preliminary hearing may ... be received for impeachment of state-
ments about the same matters made by the accused on his direct examination.
Id. at 381.
15. 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
16. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). Briefly stated, the Mallory rule makes statements made by a
criminal defendant during a period of unnecessary delay in bringing the defendant before
a committing magistrate inadmissible. This rule was adopted as a method of enforcing rule
five of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which require arraignment before a magis-
trate without unnecessary delay.
17. The Court found, however, that there was no unnecessary delay so as to make the
defendant's statement inadmissible under the Mallory rule.
18. The Court limited its holding to "trustworthy" statements made by the defendant.
The Court said "[t]he petitioner made no claim that the statements made to the police were
coerced or involuntary." 91 S. Ct. at 645. This statement suggests that the rule announced by
the Court may be limited to only those instances where the defendant makes no claim that
his pre-trial statements were coerced or involuntary.
19711
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Miranda9 and that a defendant who purposely files false wagering regis-
tration forms is not protected by claiming the fifth amendment.2 0 The
same reasoning is applied in this case: the defendant cannot make false
statements and then claim the privilege of self-incrimination to exclude
prior inconsistent statements. The opinion contends that the prosecution




There has always been a split of authority in both the federal and
the state courts as to whether illegally obtained statements may be used
to impeach an accused on cross-examination. The great majority of cases
hold that this is an impermissible practice. 22 The rationale of the majority
position is that illegally obtained confessions or statements initially are
not trustworthy and additionally that the admission of these statements
into evidence is a violation of the fifth amendment. 23 In the instant case,
then, the Court follows a small minority in arriving at its conclusion.
Miranda v. Arizona, decided in 1966, held that
[T]he fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination ap-
plies to "custodial interrogation" and that statements obtained
from a suspect during such interrogation are inadmissible unless
the prosecution has employed procedural safeguards to "secure"
the privilege. 4
The Court feared the possibility of "third-degree" interrogation, and
[A]lthough mentioning the danger of false confessions, the
Court made it clear that it condemned such an "interrogation
environment" primarily because of the injury to the dignity of
the suspect .... [T]he Court is concerned not only with invol-
untary confessions but also with involuntary questioning .... 25
The requirements of Miranda are but means of protecting the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant.
According to Chief Justice Burger, Miranda is not controlling in the
19. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966). On this point Dennis cites United
States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965).
20. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969).
21. Harris v. New York, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645 (1971).
22. Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; White v. United States, 349
F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Bayless
v. United States, 150 F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1945) ; People v. Pelkola, 19 II1. 2d 156, 166 N.E.2d
54 (1960) ; People v. Hiller, 2 Ill. 2d 323, 118 N.E.2d 11 (1954) ; People v. Sweeney, 304 III.
502, 136 N.E. 687 (1922); Ladner v. State, 231 Miss. 445, 95 So.2d 468 (1957); State v.
Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960) ; State v. Goodwin, 207 Or. 642, 298 P.2d 1024
(1956) ; Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 478 (1963) ; Annot., 9 A.L.R. 1358 (1920).
23. "If no other evidence on the ground of contradicting the defendant as a witness could
be found, he had better have gone uncontradicted than that his legal rights as a prisoner
should be so violated . ... " State v. Shepard, 88 Wis. 185, 187, 59 N.W. 449, 450 (1894).
See also Ladner v. State, 231 Miss. 445, 450, 95 So.2d 468, 471 (1957): "The admission of an
involuntary confession is a denial of the guarantees of the due process of law."
24. The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HAsv. L. Rgv. 191, 201 (1966).
Z5. Id. at 204.
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present case. It is true that Miranda barred the use of improperly ob-
tained statements or confessions in the prosecution's case-in-chief. It is
also true that "comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as
indicating a bar to the use of an uncounseled statement for any pur-
pose."26 Will the policy reasons behind Miranda be carried out when
statements obtained during police interrogation-conducted without the
correct procedures or safeguards-are used for impeachment purposes? Is
it consistent with Miranda to allow the state to do indirectly what it is not
allowed to do directly? Is it not true that
[T]o permit the Government to introduce illegally obtained
statements which bear directly on a defendant's guilt or inno-
cence in the name of "impeachment" would seriously jeopardize
the important substantive policies and functions underlying the
established exclusionary rules?2 7
Can this question be dismissed merely because the jury has been in-
structed to consider the statements only for impeachment purposes? Or,
is this a situation where "constitutional rights may suffer as much from
subtle intrusions as from direct disregard?"2
The Court's decision seems to be based primarily on Walder v.
United States. But as mentioned in the dissent, Walder is easily distin-
guished. In that case the defendant was impeached on a collateral issue. 9
Michelson, cited in Walder, concerns the right of the state to call a repu-
tation witness to counteract the reputation witnesses called by the de-
fendant. It is an established rule of evidence that when the defendant
calls a reputation witness, he opens the door to that subject and the prose-
cution may pursue the point with contradictory witnesses. 30 Tate and
Bailey are similar cases in that they deal primarily with minor or col-
lateral matters. The rulings in these cases, especially in light of the
majority of cases on point, should not automatically be extended to cover
the situation in Harris.
The Harris opinion briefly mentions the problem of perjury stating
that the privilege to testify in one's own defense "cannot be construed to
include the right to commit perjury."'" This is the essence of Chief Justice
Burger's reasoning. Burger envisions the Court as being faced with com-
peting policies: one which prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence
26. 91 S. Ct. at 645. For example, the Miranda Court stated:
[T]here can be no doubt that the fifth amendment privilege . . . serves to protect
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant
way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.
Miranda at 467.
27. Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
28. Bayless v. United States, 150 F.2d 236, 238 (8th Cir. 1945). But see note 16 supra.
29. Note that it is nowhere mentioned that according to standard rules of evidence, there
can be no impeachment on a collateral issue. C. MCCORMICK, LAW oF EvixDFca § 47 (1954).
30. See, e.g., Ivey v. State, 132 Fla. 36, 52 So. 194 (1910).
31. 91 S. Ct. at 645.
1971]
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and the other which demands the truth from a witness. 2 A "cautious
balancing" is necessary. For Burger and the majority of this Court, the
second objective is more important to the administration of justice. The
Court reasons that if a prior statement of the defendant cannot be used
against him for impeachment or as evidence, there is more of a tendency
on the part of the defendant to perjure himself by contradicting his prior
statement with his in-court testimony. On the other hand, the majority of
the impeachment cases, the majority in Miranda, and the dissent in
Harris would give the first objective-that of prohibiting the use of
illegally obtained evidence-a definite priority.
The result in this case cannot be considered surprising in view of the
change in the composition of the Court. Justices Harlan, Stewart and
White were in the dissent in Miranda. Chief Justice Burger was the dis-
trict court judge in Johnson v. United States' which permitted the use of
an "improperly" obtained confession for impeachment purposes, and he
also wrote the opinion in Tate v. United States, exemplifying the same
view. With the instant decision the Court is in effect undercutting both
Miranda's attempt to supply adequate safeguards to keep the fifth amend-
ment self-incrimination clause intact and to more effectively "police the
police" and the Weeks exclusionary rule which Walder does not claim to
have overruled.
The Court is in essence adopting the position of a minority of states
by holding that impeachment by means of illegally obtained evidence is
permissible. However, the Court makes no mention of these cases, relying
instead on the cases which have eroded the exclusionary rule of Weeks. In
this author's opinion, the Court by so doing, ignores a possibly more valid
method-that of following an established line of cases-which it could
have used to arrive at its desired result.
JAN NOVACK
THIRTY DOLLARS OR THIRTY DAYS: EQUAL PROTECTION
FOR INDIGENTS
Two defendants, convicted of arson, were granted probation on the
condition that each pay a fine of $2500 plus a penalty assessment of $625,
or in lieu of payment, serve one day in the county jail for each $10 un-
paid. This procedure was authorized by statute.i One defendant paid
and was summarily released from custody. The other defendant, Antazo,
was an indigent and therefore began serving his default sentence. While
incarcerated, he petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of
32. Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
33. 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
1. CAL. PZAi. CODE § 1205 (Deering 1960).
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